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Introduction and Overview of Issues
Biology,1 as one of the three primary natural sciences and, like its counterpart sciences of
chemistry and physics, uses the experimental method2 to gain knowledge.3 However, unlike its
counterparts, the study of biology inherently involves living things, including human beings.4
Because of this distinction, which implicates both human rights and the Hippocratic Oath,5 the
experimental method becomes legally and ethically unacceptable as a means of studying biology,
1

“The prefix bio- comes from Greek bios, meaning “life.” When used to form words in English, bio- generally

refers to living organisms or to biology, the science of living organisms.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE, BOOK OF
ENGLISH USAGE: A PRACTICAL AND AUTHORITATIVE GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH 244 (Houghton Mifflin
Co. 1996).
2

The “experimental method” is defined as “the use of controlled observations and measurements to test

hypotheses.” PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, WORDNET 2.0 (2003), at http://www.cogsci.princeton.edu/cgibin/webwn1.7.1?stage=1&word=experimental+method.
3

E.g., HARRY HILLMAN CHARTRAND, THE COMPETITIVENESS OF NATIONS IN A GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE-BASED

ECONOMY 1.1, (April 2002), http://members.shaw.ca/competitivenessofnations/698.6%20NeoPhysiocrats%201.htm.
4

Id.

5

A major portion of the Oath of Hippocrates states “I [the physician] will follow that system of regimen which,

according to my ability and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is
deleterious and mischievous.” BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 27 (4th ed.
2001). This principle is inherently inconsistent with the experimental method, which values the integrity of the
research procedure over the integrity of the research subject.
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at least when human subjects are implicated.6 Further, knowledge gleaned in this science does
not truly come to fruition until applied and used in the real world through technological
innovations, thus the term “biotechnology.”7
Although not officially defined until 1919 by Hungarian engineer, Karl Ereky,8 the first
example of biotechnological innovations noted in the literature dates back well before Ereky’s
time to the selective breeding of livestock and growing of crops during the Agricultural
Revolution.9 Today, a sort of “biotechnological age” is being realized,10 as the United States
(U.S.) Government, alone, invested over $18 billion in biotechnology research and development
(R&D) for fiscal year 2000.11 This figure dwarfs in comparison to the R&D budgets of large
pharmaceutical companies and other commercial investors.12
6

CHARTRAND, supra note 3, at 1.1.

7

Id. at 1.4.

8

Id. at 1.5 ( “biotechnology” means “all the lines of work by which products are produced from raw materials with

the aid of living organisms”).
9

Id. at 1.4 (six thousand years ago).

10

Id. at 1.5 (according to Ereky’s prediction).

11

INFO. ASSURANCE TECH. ANALYSIS CTR. (IATAC), EXPLORING BIOTECHNOLOGY: OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: CRITICAL REVIEW AND TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (CR/TA) REPORT 13-14 (January 31,
2002) [hereinafter IATAC REPORT]. The following figures represent U.S. Government expenditures for
biotechnology research and development in FY ’00: $15,185 million, National Institutes of Health (NIH); $1,939
million, Centers for Disease Control (CDC); $580 million, Department of Defense (DoD); $305.8 million,
Department of Energy (DoE). Id.
12

See generally COMM. ON OPPORTUNITIES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY FOR FUTURE ARMY APPLICATIONS, BD. ON ARMY

SCI. & TECH., DIV. ON ENG. & PHYSICAL SCI’S, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OPPORTUNITIES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY
FOR FUTURE ARMY APPLICATIONS

1 (2001)[hereinafter NRC REPORT],
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Beyond the financial investment in biotechnology is the investment this field of science
calls for from both individuals and society as a whole. Because the testing and use of
biotechnological products inherently involves living organisms from microbes to human
beings,13 complex legal and ethical issues arise, the solutions to which have yet to be answered,
and, at times, even addressed. Basic standards for research using human subjects have been

http://www.nap.edu/openbook/0309075556/html/R1/html. The average cost for development of a new therapeutic
compound exceeds $400 million. Id. at 64.
13

CHARTRAND, supra note 3, at 1.7. Each category of biotechnological “tools” identified involves the use of living

organisms or constituent parts of living organisms:
(a) Fermentation: using microbes to convert a substance such as starch or sugar into other
compounds such as carbon dioxide and ethanol;
(b) Selection and Breeding: manipulating microbes, plants or animals, and choosing desirable
individuals or populations as breeding stock for new generations;
(c) Genetic Analysis: studying how traits and genes for traits are passed from generation to
generation and how genes and the environment interact to result in specific traits;
(d) Tissue Culture: growing plant or animal tissues or cells in test tubes or other laboratory
glassware for propagation, chemical production and/or medical research;
(e) Genetic Engineering/Recombinant DNA (rDNA): transferring a DNA segment from one
organism and inserting it into the DNA of another. The two may be totally unrelated –
spiders and goats; and,
(f) DNA Analysis: including polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to make copies of a DNA segment
and RFLP mapping (restriction fragment length polymorphism) to detect patterns in DNA that
may indicate the presence of a trait gene. Both PCR and RFLP analysis are used in “DNA
fingerprinting” for genealogical studies and forensics. . . . .
Id.
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enunciated in international instruments beginning with the Nuremberg Code,14 but, as history has
shown, the research context has often dictated whether such standards would apply, and to what
extent, in actual practice15. Furthermore, research involving the use of human “materials,”
namely stem cells16 and embryos,17 raises perhaps even more controversial issues than human
subject research. Once biotech products are developed, a new series of debates arises as to
whether their use is appropriate, and, if so, by whom and for what purpose,18 as well as what may
be done with information obtained through the research or the use of biotechnology.19
14

2 U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS

UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO.
ET AL.,
15

10, at 181-82 (containing full text of the Nuremberg Code); BARRY R. FURROW

BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 413-14 (4th ed. 2001) (also containing text of Code).

See generally FURROW ET AL., supra note 14, at 419-421 (describing the history of abuse of human research

subjects in U.S. Government-sponsored research, including, but not limited to, the Human Radiation Experiments
and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study).
16

See generally President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Stem Cell Research (Aug. 9, 2001),

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/print/10010809-2.htm.
17

See generally THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY: AN ETHICAL

INQUIRY (July 10, 2002) [hereinafter CLONING REPORT], http://www.bioethics.gov/cloningreport /transmittal.html.
18

See generally THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, STAFF WORKING PAPER 7: DISTINGUISHING THERAPY

AND ENHANCEMENT,
19

http://www.bioethics.gov/workpaper7.html (last revised Aug. 20, 2002).

To the greatest extent possible, the privacy of individual subjects’ health-related information must be protected.

Informing subjects of the actual and potential limits to privacy protection, as well as the possible consequences of
disclosure of health-related information, is essential to meet voluntary and informed consent requirements. See, e.g.,
COUNCIL FOR INT’L ORGS. OF MED. SCIS. (CIOMS), INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL
RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (Aug. 2002), http://www.cioms.ch/guidelines_sept_2002_fp.htm (stating
in Guideline 18 “The investigator must establish secure safeguards of the confidentiality of subjects’ research data.
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Ultimately, this question is presented: Do the benefits of biotechnology outweigh risks
associated with these unresolved issues? Our answer may depend on what stands to be lost if
testing and use of biotech products is not pursued. In the public health context, these products
provide potential solutions to pressing concerns in the national, as well as global, arena.
Developments in genetically engineered foods and drugs, for example, pose alternatives to
addressing issues of world hunger and disease. In the medical context, biotech products have
revolutionized health care by providing new options for injury and illness prevention, as well as
treatment, in the form of pharmaceuticals, procedures, and devices.
Also affected on a global scale and, perhaps, ever-so-evident with the recent threats of
bioterrorism, are the opportunities biotechnology presents in the military context,20 which is

Subjects should be told the limits, legal or other, to the investigator’s ability to safeguard confidentiality and the
possible consequences of breaches of confidentiality.”).
20

E.g., IATAC REPORT, supra note 11, at 89-99 app. C, 101-111 app. D (including, but not limited to, the following

Exemplars: Advanced Military Medicine, including advanced vaccines and immune enhancements for
expeditionary warfare and homeland security, accelerated wound healing, and stasis for critical warfighter
casualties; Human Performance Enhancement, including 24x7 operations, enhanced environmental endurance for
the warfighter, and enhanced cognition for improved warfighter performance). The Report also contains legal
position papers favorable to the following uses of biotechnology by DoD: genetic screening for missions selection;
transitory genome altering enhancements; permanent genome altering enhancements. Id. at 73-88 app. B. See also
NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 2 tbl. ES-1 (containing the following “Prospective Army Applications” [of biotech
products] and their respective descriptions:
Camouflage and concealment - Biomaterials with stealth characteristics; nonilluminating paints
and coatings.
Combat identification – Biological markers to distinguish friendly soldiers.
...
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Functional foods – Additives to improved nutrition, enhance digestion, improved storage
characteristics, enable battlefield identification, reduce detectability; edible vaccines; . . .
Health monitoring – Devices to provide feedback on soldier status, enable remote triage, and
augment network of external sensors to provide intelligence on chemical, biological, or
environmental agents.
...
Lightweight armor – Protection for soldiers and combat systems; systems with living
characteristics, such as self-repairing body armor.
Novel materials – Biologically inspired materials; . . . ; genetically engineered proteins; . . .
Performance enhancement – Cortical implants; computer input and display interfaces; prostheses
control; sensory enhancement; antidotal implants; gene-expression monitoring; performanceenhancing drugs.
...
Sensing battlefield environments – Laboratories-on-a-chip to detect and identify chemical,
biological, and environmental threat molecules on the battlefield; coupling of diagnostic and
therapeutic functions.
...
Soldier therapeutics – Drugs to counteract shock; genomics-based, directed therapies; optimized
responsiveness to vaccines.
...
Vaccine development – Reduced development and production times for small-scale requirements
to respond to disease encountered in exotic locales.
Wound healing – Engineered skin, tissue, and organs; wound dressings and treatments to curtail
bleeding and accelerate healing.).
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defined as “the exploitation and manipulation of biological systems to benefit overall military
capability”21. According to a recent report by the Information Assurance Technology Analysis
Center (IATAC), “history has shown that an infusion of technology can provide a significant
military advantage to the side that first realizes its potential and exploits it.”22 However, the
historical examples described, namely invention of the tank, development of U.S. naval aviation
capabilities, and technologies emerging from the Information Revolution, fail to invoke the legal
and ethical complexities presented by biotechnological research, development, and use in the
military. Such concerns become particularly relevant in light of the history of abuse of civilians
and service member subjects in research conducted or sponsored by the militaries of both the
U.S.23 and its European Ally, the United Kingdom (U.K.).24, 25
21

Dr. Steve Nicklin, Medical Issues: The Future Impact of Biotechnology on Human Factors, in NATO RESEARCH

& TECH. ORG., RTO MEETING PROCEEDINGS 77: HUMAN FACTORS IN THE 21ST CENTURY, RTO-MP-077
AC/323(HFM-062)TP/38 19-1 (June 11-13, 2001) (pub’d May 2002),
http://www.rta.nato.int/Abstracts.asp?RestrictPanel=HFM.
22

IATAC REPORT, supra note 11, at 2.

23

Jacques G. Richardson, Serious Misapplications of Military Research: Dysfunction between Conception and

Implementation, 7S CI. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 347, 349-51 (2001).
24

The term “United Kingdom” as used in this paper refers to England. See generally Prof. David Price, United

Kingdom, in 3 MEDICAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS ¶¶ 6, 8 (Prof. Dr. H. Hys, ed., Supp. 27
2002) [hereinafter Price, United Kingdom] (stating:
At one time the British Empire was over one-quarter of the earth’s surface but it has gradually
retrenched and dissolved with the vast majority of former colonies having achieved their own
independence . . . . [Regarding the U.K., itself,] [t]here have been very significant movements
towards devolution within the United Kingdom in recent years, with Scotland, Northern Ireland
and Wales becoming, to a greater or lesser extent, autonomous from England.).
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Although legal and ethical requirements for human subject research technically do not
exclude military entities, statutory and judicial “loopholes” have emerged in the U.S.,26 while the
U.K. has been slow to develop binding legal safeguards for non-military, much less military,
research subjects27. As recently demonstrated by the joint U.S.-U.K. support for an invasion of
25

Rob Evans, Guinea Pigs’ Grievance: Experiments undertaken at the laboratories of Porton Down have left a

legacy of doubt. Now ministers must decide if inquiry is needed. THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 26, 2001,
http://www.geocities.com/ukgulfwarhelp/guardian26022001.htm (reporting that Britain’s Ministry of Defence
(MoD), which is responsible for “the world’s longest programme of chemical warfare experiments on humans,” has
subjected over 20,000 service members to the testing of poisonous gasses, chemical weapons and protective drugs at
its lab in Porton Down, Wiltshire from 1916 to the present); see also Jim Green, UK Admits Military Personnel
Deliberately Exposed to Nuclear Tests, ENVTL. NEWS SERVICE, May 18, 2001, http://ensnews.com/ens/may2001/2001-05-18-04.asp (reporting that on May 11, 2001, the MoD officially confirmed the use
of service members from Britain, Australian and New Zealand for radiation experiments conducted in Australia in
the 1950’s).
26

See, e.g., George J. Annas, Protecting Soldiers from Friendly Fire: The Consent Requirement for Using

Investigational Drugs and Vaccines in Combat, 24 AM. J. L. & MED. 245, 247-250 (1998) (discussing the use of
investigational drugs and vaccines on soldiers without their informed consent, as allowed by 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(d)
and upheld by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370 (1991)); Michael
I. Braverman, Comment, Allowing Free Reign in the Military Establishment: Has the Court Allowed Too Much
Deference Where Constitutional Rights are at Stake? – United States v. Stanley, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 278,
278-81, 303-10 (1989) (criticizing the Majority holding in U.S. v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987), for denying exserviceman a Bivens remedy for injuries sustained in experiments in which military researchers failed to obtain
subject’s informed consent).
27

See PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL LAW ¶¶ 13.03, 13.65 (Ian Kennedy & Andrew Grubb, eds. 1998) [hereinafter

KENNEDY & GRUBB] (stating that no overarching statutory framework exists to govern research involving human
subjects, as compared to the comprehensive legislation covering use of animal research subjects, and, moreover, no
present English case law directly relates to research conduct); ANDREW GRUBB, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL LAW ¶¶
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Iraq,28 these two countries are strong Allies. Their respective domestic laws and policies,29 as
well as international treaties,30 call for collaboration in major military matters ranging from
scientific R&D to the interoperability of forces.
However, collaboration presents controversy in the context of biotechnology.
Concerning biotech R&D, which inherently involves techniques such as stem cell research31 and
13.66-13.74 (4th ed. Supp. 2001) [hereinafter FOURTH CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT] (noting that new guidance has
been issued, although still in non-statutory form, from the Department of Health (DoH): Research Governance
Framework for Health and Social Care, March 2001; Governance Arrangements for NHS Research Ethics
Committees, July 2001; Research Governance Implementation Plan, October 2001).
28

See Anne E. Kornblut, Blair Backs Bush Effort Against Iraq; Cites New Data; Call For Support is Strongest Yet,

THE BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 8, 2002, at A.1; Glenn Frankel, Blair Assails Hussein, Backs Bush on Iraq, THE WASH.
POST, Sept. 4, 2002, at A16.
29

The U.S. has codified its policy in 32 C.F.R. Part 258, “Cooperation with Allies in Research and Development of

Defense Equipment,” which states “[t]he United States will cooperate with its Allies to the greatest degree possible
in the development of defense equipment, where such cooperation is in the overall best interests of the United
States.” 32 C.F.R. § 258.3(a) (2002). Regarding U.K. policy, the MoD urges “In absolute terms, the US spends ten
times as much as we do in the UK on defence research, whilst Europe as a whole spends four times as much as us.
Maintaining close collaboration with these partners, . . . , will be vital . . . . . . . Access to US technology will . . .
continue to be of particular importance.” MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE FUTURE STRATEGIC CONTEXT FOR DEFENCE
29 & 30 (2002), http://www.mod.uk/issues/strategic_context/technological.htm.
30

International law is reflected in, for example, The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP), a collaborative

research treaty between the U.S., the U.K., and other nations, which directly implicates the Military Establishments.
See DOD Instruction 3100.8 (Sept. 11, 1973) (stating, in paragraph 1.2, “the primary objective of TTCP is to
acquaint participating countries . . . with military research and development programs conducted by each country,
and to provide a means to carry out cooperative R&D ventures”).
31

Stem cells are those capable of replacing other dead or damaged cells. NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 37. As

stated by President Bush, “most scientists, at least today, believe that research on [human] embryonic stem cells
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somatic cell nuclear transfer,32 questions arise as to how the U.S., with its limit of federal
funding to only existing stem cell lines33 and potential for banning any funding of therapeutic
cloning,34 can effectively collaborate with the U.K., which already funds these techniques35.
Considering the extent of federal funding allotted to military research36 in light of the

offer[s] the most promise because these cells have the potential to develop in all of the tissues in the body.” Bush,
supra note 16.
32

Also known as “cloning,” the controversy surrounding somatic cell nuclear transfer concerns “cloning-for-

biomedical research,” or so-called “therapeutic cloning,” in which human embryos are cloned to provide a source of
stem cells, a process that effectively “kills” the cloned embryo itself. See generally, CLONING REPORT, supra note
17; see also Associated Press, Stem Cell Rules Spark Complaints (Sept. 26, 2002) available at
http://www.jsonline.com/alive/ap/sep02/ap-stem-cells092602.asp.
33

See Bush, supra note 16.

34

Senator Sam Brownback, with the support of President Bush, has proposed legislation criminalizing all cloning

techniques, including therapeutic cloning. Ellen Sorokin, Moral Outrage Follows Law Permitting Embryonic Study,
THE WASH. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002.
35

See CLONING REPORT, supra note 17 (stating that in the U.K., “cloning-for-biomedical-research is allowed, but

only with cloned embryos no older than fourteen days”); see also Associated Press, supra note 31, (reporting that
some American scientists are moving their research projects to England because “its government encourages stem
cell research”).
36

President Bush’s 2003 Department of Defense budget proposal calls for $53.9 billion to fund research,

development, testing and evaluation programs (RDT&E), with an additional $9.9 billion proposed for Science and
Technology (S&T). ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, THE NEW AMERICAN
APPROACH TO DEFENSE: THE FY2003 PROGRAM, NOTES ON HOMELAND DEFENSE, COUNTERTERRORISM,
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE, AND FORCE TRANSFORMATION 20 (Feb. 6, 2002).
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collaboration required by both domestic and international instruments,37 compliance with the
proposed U.S. restrictions becomes, at best, illusory.
Moreover, joint operability of U.S. and U.K. forces presumably requires the use of jointly
operable equipment and supplies, including biotech products. Even if these products go through
testing and development in the more “liberal” U.K., they would, in practice, be used on both
British and American soldiers38. Oftentimes, military matters demand the use of any product that
could provide even a potential advantage over the adversary, regardless of whether the product
has been fully tested.39 Possible side effects of usage, especially long-term, are of little
consequence in the face of a present and pressing enemy.40
37

See U.S. and U.K. policies, supra note 29; see also TTCP treaty, supra note 30.

38

The interoperability of U.S. and U.K. forces is essential to serve the purposes of major international agreements

such as North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)’s Washington Treaty, which sets forth a principle of “collective
security.” See DEF. COMM., THE FUTURE OF NATO, SEVENTH REPORT 7 (July 30, 2002),
http://www.publications.parialment.uk/pa/cm/cmdfence.htm. Specifically, Article 5 of the Treaty states:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America
shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed
attack occurs, each of them . . . will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith,
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the
use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Id.
39

See 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(d)(1) (2002) (“Under 10 U.S.C. 1107(f) the President may waive the prior consent

requirement for the administration of an investigational new drug to a member of the armed forces in connection
with the member’s participation in a particular military operation.”); see also 10 U.S.C. § 1107(f)(1) (2000) (“In the
case of the administration of an investigational new drug or a drug unapproved for its applied use to a member of the
armed forces in connection with the member’s participation in a particular military operation, the requirement that
the member provide prior consent to receive the drug in accordance with the prior consent requirement imposed
Unpublished Work © 2003 Ashley R. Melson, J.D., R.P.T.
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Beyond research, development, and use issues surrounding biotechnology in the military
are related and equally complex privacy issues invoked by, for example, the collection and
storage of DNA samples from individual service members41. Although knowledge of each
soldiers’ genetic make-up may be relevant, if not crucial, to present mission success,42 that same
knowledge could later prove disastrous for the individual service member if revealed outside the
military context43. Allied collaboration efforts further hamper confidentiality by allowing not
only a service member’s own country, but potentially many foreign nations, access to the most
detailed information, health-related and other, regarding individual service members.
Despite the legal and ethical concerns raised, biotechnology has, and will continue, to
offer countless opportunities for enhancing military capabilities. As such, the research,

under section 505(i)(4) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355(i)(4)) may be waived only by
the President.”); DOD Directive 6200.2 (Aug. 1, 2000).
40

For example, the cyclical use of chemical stimulants and depressants despite both known and suspected side

effects has been a documented practice of military pilots throughout history and as recently as the present “war on
terrorism.” See Brad Knickerbocker, Military Looks to Drugs for Battle Readiness, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug.
9, 2002, at 1, http://ebird.dtic.mil/Aug2002/e20020809military.htm.
41

See, e.g, Mayfield v. Dalton, 901 F. Supp. 300, 302 (D. Haw. 1995) (upholding constitutionality of DoD

repository of individual soldiers’ DNA collected from cheek swab, as information had limited purpose of identifying
soldier remains), vacated on other grounds, 109 F.3d 1423, 1424 (9th Cir. 1997).
42

See IATAC REPORT, supra note 11, at 73-77 app. B; NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 63 (“Combat effectiveness

can be increased by enhancing the performance of individual soldiers. Because genomics information offers clues to
improving human performance, it could provide the Army with means of increasing combat effectiveness.”).
43

See IATAC REPORT, supra note 11, at 74-75 (stating “Might dissemination of such information, acquired for

legitimate national security purposes be used in civilian life to deny health benefits or employment to those affected
service members.”).
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development and utilization of biotech products are present realities in the U.S. and abroad, both
within and outside of the defense context. However, testing and usage, as well as effective
collaboration between Allies, calls for the resolution of complex and pressing issues presented by
this intersection of science, technology, and human lives. Resolutions must take into account the
history of abuses in military research, existing domestic and international legal and ethical
safeguards, and a special respect for those serving to protect their country. In the present global
“war on terrorism,”44 the U.S. and its Allies should heed this caution:
The military enterprise is at once ethical and unethical. Ethical from “our” point
of view because the nation is protected from aggressors, defended when attacked,
determined to win at all costs. Unethical, especially as seen through the
adversary’s eyes, because anything goes. The victimization of noncombatants,
misinformation and disinformation, clever feints, deception and other ploys of
elaborate trickery, are the stock-in-trade of the “other” side. “We”, of course,
resort to the same (and often more) to preserve the power position, strategic
balance, operational gain, or tactical advantage. Might makes right, in other
words, and hopefully for our team, righter yet. Not only does anything go;
everything goes. The ‘un-morality’ of war rubs off on, and too often guides, those
charged with researching and developing new and more effective weapons
systems.45
Domestic Law and Policy of the United States
To date, the U.S. government has enacted federal legislation addressing the testing,
usage, and privacy concerns presented by biotechnology. However, the extent that these broad
protections apply to the Department of Defense (DoD) is debatable. Considerations affecting the
actual influence of existing protections in the military context include the deference afforded this
Establishment by other departments and agencies, the related judicial deference evidenced in
44

THE COALITION INFO. CTRS., THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: THE FIRST 100 DAYS 3 (Dec. 2001),

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/100dayreport.htm.
45

Jacques Richardson, supra note 23, at 347-48.
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both historical, as well as more recent, federal opinions, and the problem of oversight and
enforcement of existing regulations by civilians in a non-civilian arena.
Concerning the research and testing of biotech products, both the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have
promulgated rules for the protection of human research subjects. The basic DHHS Federal
Policy (hereinafter Policy), set forth in 45 C.F.R. Part 46, applies to “all research involving
human subjects conducted, supported or otherwise subject to regulation by any federal
department or agency.”46 The actual scope of the Policy is far-reaching in that it expressly states
“[f]ederal funds administered by a department or agency may not be expended for research
involving human subjects unless the requirements of this policy have been satisfied.”47 Further,
both the activity of “research”48 and the covered class of “human subjects”49 are broadly defined.
Clearly this Policy applies to the Defense Department as it constitutes a federal
department50 and, being a government entity, is dependant upon federal funding51 for all of its
46

45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2002).

47

Id. at § 46.122.

48

This Policy defines “research” as “a systematic investigation, including research, development, testing, and

evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge.” Id. at § 46.102(d).
49

A “human subject” is “a living individual about whom an investigator (whether professional or student)

conducting research obtains (1) Data through intervention or interaction with the individual, or (2) Identifiable
private information. . . . .” Id. at § 46.102(f).
50

“Department . . . head means the head of any federal department . . . and any other office or employee of any

department . . . to whom authority has been delegated.” Id. at § 46.102(a). In the defense context, the Secretary of
Defense stands as the department head, but authority in the research context is delegated to numerous other offices
and employees. See DOD DIRECTIVE 3210.1, ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT OF BASIC RESEARCH BY THE DOD 4.2
(Oct. 26, 1961) (Administrative Reissuance Incorporating Change 1, Apr. 3, 1970) (stating “The Director of Defense
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activities, including research52. Moreover, defense-related research implicates human subject
participants in that the individual warfighter is the single most determinative factor of overall
mission success53. Any doubt as to the Policy’s impact on research “conducted, supported, or
subject to regulation by [DoD]” is resolved by the explicit adoption of the “Common Rule”54 at

Research and Engineering is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the review and direction of the basic
research program of the Military Departments and other Agencies of the Department of Defense authorized to
conduct or support basic research, . . . .”).
51

See Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Department of Defense Budget: Fiscal Year 2003 II

(Feb. 2002), http://www.dtic.mil/comptroller/fy2003budget/fy_2003r1.pdf (total appropriations for DoD Research,
Development, Testing & Evaluation Programs ($ in thousands): 41,748,375 for FY 2001; 48,504,626 for FY 2002;
53,856,962 for FY 2003).
52

“Defense research” encompasses:
scientific study and experimentation directed toward increasing knowledge and understanding in
those fields of the physical, engineering, environmental, biological-medical, and behavioral-social
sciences directly related to explicitly stated long-term national security needs.

It provides

fundamental knowledge for the solution of identified military problems. It also provides part of
the base for subsequent exploratory and advanced developments in defense-related technologies
and of new or improved military functional capabilities in areas such as communications,
detection, tracking, surveillance, propulsion, mobility, guidance and control, navigation, energy
conversion, materials and structures, and personnel support.
DOD DIRECTIVE 3210.1, supra note 49, at 3.
53

See IATAC REPORT, supra note 11.

54

The “Common Rule” denotes the regulation that exactly duplicates DHHS (Federal) Policy and has been adopted

by multiple Federal Agencies for the protection of human research subjects. See DOD DIRECTIVE 3216.2,
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS AND ADHERENCE TO ETHICAL STANDARDS IN DOD-SUPPORTED RESEARCH 4.3.1,
E2.1.1 (Mar. 25, 2002). Therefore, in practice, DoD funding of research is limited to those research activities
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32 C.F.R. Part 219. Additionally, 10 U.S.C. § 980 limits the use of defense-appropriated
research funds to only those experiments in which the subject has given informed consent.55

meeting Policy requirements. See generally 45 C.F.R. Part 46 (listing requirements, which include, but are not
limited to, the following:
§ 46.109(a) An IRB [Institutional Review Board] shall review and have authority to approve,
require modification in (to secure approval), or disapprove all research activities covered by this
policy. . . .
§ 46.111(a) In order to approve research covered by this policy the IRB shall determine that all of
the following requirements are satisfied:
(1) Risks to subjects are minimized: . . .
(2) Risks to subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, and the
importance of the knowledge that may be expected to result. . . .
(3) Selection of subjects is equitable. . . .
(4) Informed consent will be sought from each prospective subject or the subject’s legally
authorized representative, in accordance with, and to the extent required by § 46.116.
(5) Informed consent will be appropriately documented, . . .
(6) When appropriate, the research plan makes adequate provision for monitoring the data
collected to ensure the safety of subjects.
(7) When appropriate, there are adequate provisions to protect the privacy of subjects and to
maintain the confidentiality of data.).
55

The statute states:
Funds appropriated to the Department of Defense may not be used for research involving a human
being as an experimental subject unless – (1) the informed consent of the subject is obtained in
advance; or (2) in the case of research intended to be beneficial to the subject, the informed
consent of the subject or a legal representative of the subject is obtained in advance.
10 U.S.C. § 980(a) (2000).
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Department-specific regulation in the form of a DoD Directive implements Part 219,
along with § 980, and “establishes other DoD policies for the ethical conduct of research.”56
This Directive governs research involving human subjects57 that is either “conducted by a DoD
Component” or “supported58 by a DoD Component . . . through a contract, grant, cooperative
agreement, or other arrangement.”59 Once a research activity meets this scope provision, human
subject participants are protected not only through the implementation of federal legislation but
also by DoD-specific policy provisions. Safeguards contained in the latter address education and
training regarding human subject protections,60 internal61 and external62 oversight mechanisms,
56

DOD DIRECTIVE 3216.2, supra note 54, at 1.2-1.4.

57

“Research involving human subjects” means “an activity, for research purposes, where there is an intervention or

interaction with a human being for the primary purpose of obtaining data regarding the effect of the intervention or
interaction (reference omitted).” Id. at E2.1.3. “Intervention or interaction” includes, but is not limited to, “a
physical procedure, a drug, a manipulation of the subject or the subject’s environment, the withholding of an
intervention that would have been undertaken if not for the research purpose.” Id.
58

“Support” is generally defined as “the provision of funding, personnel, facilities, and all other resources.” Id. at

E2.1.4.
59

Id. at 2.2.

60

“Awareness of human subjects protection requirements shall be established for all DoD personnel involved in the

conduct, review, or approval of research covered by this Directive.” Id. at 4.5. Notably, this provision applies to all
DoD personnel engaged in carrying out the research but fails to address the education of subjects, themselves,
regarding their own protections.
61

“All DoD Components shall establish procedures to monitor and review the ethical conduct of research.” Id. at

4.8.
62

Medical monitors:
4.4.3. For research involving more than minimal risk (reference omitted) to subjects, an
independent medical monitor shall be appointed by name. Medical monitors shall be physicians,
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and the potential for influence of superior officers over service members serving as research
subjects63.

dentists, psychologists, nurses, or other healthcare providers capable of overseeing the progress of
research protocols, especially issues of individual subject/patient management and safety.
Medical monitors shall be independent of the investigative team and shall possess sufficient
educational and professional experience to serve as the subject/patient advocate.
4.4.3.1. Depending on the nature of the study, the medical monitor may be assigned to assess
one or more of the following phases of a research project: subject recruitment, subject enrollment,
data collection, or data storage and management.
4.4.3.2. At the discretion of the IRB, the medical monitor may be assigned to discuss research
progress with the principal investigator, interview subjects, consult on individual cases, or
evaluate adverse event reports. Medical monitors shall promptly report discrepancies or problems
to the IRB. They shall have the authority to stop a research study in progress, remove individual
subjects from a study, and take whatever steps are necessary to protect the safety and well-being
of research subjects until the IRB can assess the medical monitor’s report.
Id. at 4.4.3 - 4.4.3.2 (emphasis added).
63

Potential for influence:
4.4.4. For research involving more than minimal risk and also involving military personnel,
unit officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) shall not influence the decisions of their
subordinates to participate or not to participate as research subjects. Unit officers and senior
NCOs in the chain of command shall not be present at the time of research subject solicitation
and consent during any research recruitment sessions in which members of units under their
command are afforded the opportunity to participate as research subjects. When applicable,
officers and NCOs so excluded shall be afforded the opportunity to participate as research subjects
in a separate recruitment session. During recruitment briefings to a unit where a percentage of the
unit is being recruited to participate as a group, an ombudsman not connected in any way with the
proposed research or the unit shall be present to monitor that the voluntary nature of individual
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Despite these military-specific protections, military-specific “loopholes” exist. Section
980, as implemented through Directive 3216.2, allows for waiver of the consent requirement in a
specific research project if such project “advance[s] the development of a medical product
necessary to the armed forces,” “may directly benefit the subject,” and complies with all other
applicable laws.64

With regard to the testing of chemical and biological agents, research using

human subjects is generally prohibited, yet exceptions exist “for research for prophylactic,
protective, or other peaceful purposes.”65 Further, all protections in the Directive are at least
potentially subject to exception “if justified by special circumstances and consistent with law.”66
These “loopholes” appear particularly relevant to military R&D of biotechnology, as the
potential offered by biotech products,67 combined with recent threats of bioterrorism68 should
readily qualify as “necessary to the armed forces,” “prophylactic” and “protective” against
chemical and biological agents, and “justified by special circumstances.”

participants is adequately stressed and that the information provided about the research is
adequate and accurate.
Id.. at 4.4.4 (emphasis added).
64

10 U.S.C.A. § 980(b) (Supp. 2002) (providing for waiver by the Secretary of Defense); DOD DIRECTIVE 3216.2,

supra note 53, at 4.4.2 (providing for waiver by the Head of a DoD Component).
65

DOD DIRECTIVE 3216.2, supra note 53, at 4.4.5.

66

Id. at 5.1.6 (allowing the Director of Defense Research and Engineering to grant exceptions to policy under this

Directive).
67

See supra note 20.

68

See Biological, Chemical, and Radiological Weapons Countermeasures Research Act of 2002, S. 3148, 107th

Cong. § 2 (Oct. 17, 2002) (stating “The threat of biological and chemical weapons is real,” and citing related
evidentiary support).
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However, classifying a biotech intervention as some form of use, rather than research,
achieves perhaps the most significant military “loophole” yet. Notably, none of the protections
from Directive 3216.2 apply to activities that are not “research.” The Directive expressly states
that neither “the use of investigational new drugs, biological products, or devices for purposes of
Force Health Protection”69 or “accepted medical practice, including the use of investigational
products in such practice, undertaken for purposes of treatment”70 constitutes “research.”
Instead, regulation of these investigational products, including new drugs and devices,
falls under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDC Act”)71. Especially relevant to the
emerging biotechnology industry is section 505, “New drugs,” which states, “No person shall
69

DOD DIRECTIVE 3216.2, supra note 53, at 2.2 (stating “Such use is not research and is governed by DoD

Directive 6200.2”).
70

Id. at 2.3.

71

21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (2000). See generally Leonard H. Glantz, The Influence of the Nuremberg Code on U.S.

Statutes and Regulations, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION 183, 186 (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin, eds., 1992 ) (noting history of Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) as follows:
The FDA’s entry into the regulation of research came as a result of the Drug Amendments Act of
1962. The primary purpose of the law was to keep unsafe or useless drugs off the market by
requiring proof of safety and efficacy from the drug companies. . . . the final version of the 1962
law contained a provision that required ‘experts using such drugs for investigational purposes’ to
inform persons to whom they are to be administered that they are being given drugs for
investigational purposes and to obtain the consent of these individuals or their representatives,
except ‘where they deem it not feasible or, in their professional judgment, contrary to the best
interest of such human beings.’

[Footnote omitted.]

It was not until 1966 that the FDA

promulgated patient consent regulations, at least partially in recognition of the widespread failure
of the industry to obtain patient consent.)
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introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval
of an application . . . is effective with respect to such drug.”72, 73 Exempt from the application and
72

21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2000).

73

Terminology:
“Drug” is defined as
(A) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia, official Homoeopathic
Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official National Formulary, or any supplement to any
of them; and
(B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease
in man or other animals; and
(C) articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or
other animals; and
(D) articles intended for use as a component of any article specified in (A), (B), or (C). . . . .
Id. at § 321(g)(1).
“New drug” is defined as
(1) Any drug . . . the composition of which is such that such drug is not generally recognized,
among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and
effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use under the conditions prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof, . . . ; or
(2) Any drug . . .the composition of which is such that such drug, as a result of investigations to
determine its safety and effectiveness for use under such conditions, has become so
recognized, but which has not, otherwise than in such investigations, been used to a material
extent or for a material time under such conditions.
Id. at § 321(p).
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approval process are so-called “investigational new drugs,”74 although their use does require the
prior informed consent of any human subject75. Even the latter is circumvented “where it
[consent] is not feasible or it is contrary to the best interest of such human beings.”76, 77
The Defense Department, first through administrative,78 and subsequently through
legislative79 and executive80 action, obtained its own exception to the consent requirement, which
has been upheld against Constitutional challenge81. Coverage encompasses drugs, including
74

See FDC Act § 505(i), 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (2000) (exempting, in paragraph (1), “drugs intended solely for

investigational use by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to investigate the safety and
effectiveness of drugs”).
75

The prior consent requirement states:
[E]xemption [of investigational new drugs] shall be conditioned upon the manufacturer, or the
sponsor of the investigation, requiring that experts using such drugs for investigational purposes
certify to such manufacturer or sponsor that they will inform any human beings to whom such
drugs, or any controls used in connection therewith, are being administered, or their
representatives, that such drugs are being used for investigational purposes and will obtain the
consent of such human beings or their representatives, . . . .
FDC Act § 505(i)(4), 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(4) (2000); see also 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2002).

76

21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(4).

77

Non-feasibility is limited to a narrow set of circumstances involving life-threatening situations in which subjects

are unable to consent and time is limited. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(a)-(c) (2002).
78

See 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(d) (2002). The original interim rule amending § 50.23 by adding a new paragraph (d) went

into effect Dec. 21, 1990. See 55 Fed. Reg. 52, 814, 52, 817 (1990) (subsequently codified at 21 C.F.R. § 50.23).
79

See 10 U.S.C. § 1107(f) (2000).

80

See Exec. Order No. 13,139, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,175 (1999).

81

See Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370, 1381-83 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding (1) the FDA’s promulgation of Rule 23(d),

allowing military use of investigational drugs for unapproved purposes and without service members’ consent, was
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antibiotics, and biological products,82, 83 and contemplates not only drugs or products lacking
approval or licensing, respectively, but also unapproved uses of an otherwise approved drug or
licensed product84.

within the authority granted to the agency by Congress; (2) use of investigational drugs under Rule 23(d) did not
violate the informed consent provision from the 1985 Defense Authorization Act; and (3) application of Rule 23(d)
under the particular circumstances, i.e., administration of preventative drugs to “combat-ready personnel” serving in
Operation Desert Storm, presented no violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
82

Terminology:

“Drug,” as defined in note 69. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (2000).
“Antibiotic drug” means “any drug … composed wholly or partly of any kind of penicillin, streptomycin,
chlortetracycline, choramphenicol, bacitracin, or any other drug intended for human use containing any quantity of
micro-organisms in dilute solution … or any derivative thereof. Id. at § 321(jj).
“Biological product” means “a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or
derivative, allergenic product, or analogous product, or arsphenamine or [derivative thereof] … , applicable to the
prevention, treatment , or cure of a disease or condition of human beings. 42 U.S. C. § 262(i) (West, WESTLAW
through P.L. 107-245 2002). This definition also applies to the FDC Act’s regulation of biological products. See id.
at § 262(j).
83

See 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(d)(1) (2002) (describing process for Presidential waiver of prior consent requirement for

the use of investigational new drugs in the military and referencing investigational drug as “including an antibiotic
or biological product”); see also DOD DIRECTIVE 6200.2, USE OF INVESTIGATIONAL NEW DRUGS FOR FORCE
HEALTH PROTECTION 3.2 (Aug. 1, 2000) (including in definition of “investigational new drug” both “a drug or
biological product”). However, the Title 10 version of this policy refers only to an “investigational new drug or
drug unapproved for its applied use,” with each respective definition covering only the term “drug” as used in
section 505 of the FDC Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000). See generally 10 U.S.C. § 1107 (2000).
84

See 10 U.S.C. § 1107(f) (describing process for requesting and obtaining Presidential waiver of prior consent

requirement for “administration of an investigational new drug or a drug unapproved for its applied use”); see also
DOD DIRECTIVE 6200.2, supra note 81, at 3.2, 3.2.1-3.2.2 (setting forth policy for the use of investigational new

Unpublished Work © 2003 Ashley R. Melson, J.D., R.P.T.

23

As codified in § 1107 of Title 10, “Armed Forces,” the exception states:
The Secretary of Defense may request the President to waive the prior consent
requirement with respect to the administration of an investigational new drug or a
drug unapproved for its applied use to a member of the armed forces in
connection with the member’s participation in a particular military operation.85
The President may grant the Secretary’s request only if the President makes a written
determination “that obtaining consent -- (A) is not feasible; (B) is contrary to the best interests of

drugs, which are defined to include “a drug not approved or a biological product not licensed by the FDA” and “a
drug unapproved for its applied use”). The latter is further defined as “a drug or biological product administered for
a use not described in the labeling of the drug or biological product approved by the FDA . . . , and for which FDA
requirements of use authorization and prior informed consent . . . are applicable . . . .” Id. at 3.3.
85

10 U.S.C. § 1107(f)(3) (2000); see also Exec. Order No. 13,139 at Sec. 3(d), 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(d)(1); see also

DOD DIRECTIVE 6200.2, supra note 82, at 4.1, 4.1.1-1.3 (setting forth DoD policy to implement the aforementioned
references:
Personnel carrying out military operations shall be provided the best possible force health
protection, including safe and effective medical countermeasures to chemical, biological or
radiological warfare and endemic disease.

DoD Components shall make preferential use of

products approved by the FDA . . . . When no FDA-approved product is available to meet a
foreseeable threat, the Secretary of the Army, . . . , shall carry out appropriate research and
development program activities . . . . When, at the time of the need for a force health protection
countermeasure against a particular threat, no safe and effective FDA-approved drug or biological
product is available, DoD Components may request approval of the Secretary of Defense to use an
IND [investigational new drug]. Such requests must be justified based on the available evidence
of the safety and efficacy of the drug against the nature and degree of the threat to personnel.)
“Force health protection” is defined as “An organized program of healthcare preventative or therapeutic treatment,
or preparations for such treatment, designed to meet the actual, anticipated, or potential needs of a group of military
personnel in relation to military missions.” Id. at 3.1.
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the [service] member; or (C) is not in the interests of national security.”86 With respect to (A)
and (B), the President must apply relevant FDA regulations in order to grant the waiver upon
either ground.87 The statute lacks any guidance as to a determination based on the final ground,
“in the interests of national security.”
Also absent is any guidance from the courts, with the only legal challenge to a militarybased consent waiver being ruled upon prior to enactment of § 1107. In Doe v. Sullivan, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the FDA’s promulgation of “Rule 23(d),”
an interim regulation allowing the administration of investigational drugs to service members
without their consent.88 As promulgated in 1990, the FDA, recognizing both the importance of
informed consent but also the non-feasibility of obtaining it in the combat context, limited DoD
requests under Rule 23(d) to “a specific military operation involving combat or the immediate
threat of combat.”89 The Doe court emphasized, throughout its opinion, the “combat”-based
justification for forced use of investigational drugs.90 Based on the specific facts of the case,91
86

10 U.S.C. § 1107(f)(1) (2000); see also Exec. Order No. 13,139 at Sec. 3(b), 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(d)(1).

87

“In making a determination to waive the prior consent requirement on a ground described in subparagraph (A) or

(B) . . . , the President shall apply the standards and criteria that are set forth in the relevant FDA regulations for a
waiver of the prior consent requirement on that ground.” 10 U.S.C. §1107(f)(2) (2000). Section 50.23, “Exception
from general requirements,” contains relevant regulations. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(a)-(c) (2002).
88

Doe, 938 F.2d at 1381-83.

89

The original interim rule amending § 50.23 by adding a new paragraph (d) went into effect Dec. 21, 1990. See 55

Fed. Reg. 52, 814, 52, 817 (1990) (subsequently codified at 21 C.F.R. § 50.23).
90

938 F.2d at 1373-74, 1381-83.

91

According to DoD, administration of the two unapproved drugs was necessary, as a preventative measure, to

counter the potential use of biological weapons by the Iraqis. Id. at 1372, n.1. Further, conducting controlled
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the court found that application of Rule 23(d) did not violate service members’ Fifth Amendment
rights under the Due Process Clause.92
Significantly, the current legislation governing military use of investigational drugs
without consent,93 as well as its corresponding FDA regulation,94 fails to address, at least through
explicit language, the “combat” concept.95 As enacted in Title 10 and referenced in the current
Code of Federal Regulations,96 § 1107(f) eliminates the “combat” language found in original
Rule 23(d) and replaces it with “in connection with the member’s participation in a particular
military operation”97. No statutory guidance exists as to what constitutes a “military operation,”
but at least common usage of the phrase denotes much more than activities involving combat or
the immediate threat of combat.98 In any event, questions arise as to whether the statutory

clinical trials on humans [in order to obtain FDA approval] was not possible because intentional exposure to
chemical or biological weapons for testing purposes is impermissible. Id.
92

Id. at 1383.

93

See 10 U.S.C. § 1107(f) (2000).

94

See 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(d) (2002).

95

Also of note are the following changes from Doe’s version of Rule 23(d) to the current version, as based on 10

U.S.C. § 1107(f): the original Rule 23(d) provided that the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs), as
opposed to the Secretary of Defense, requested the waiver, which was made to the Commissioner of Food and
Drugs, as opposed to the President.
96

Id.

97

See 10 U.S.C. § 1107(f)(1), (3) (2000).

98

Department-specific regulation defines “particular military operation” as that “which involves any chemical,

biological, or radiological warfare or endemic disease threats.” DOD DIRECTIVE, supra note 81, at 3.4. However,
federal legislation fails to offer any such definition, despite having a “definitions” subsection. See 10 U.S.C. §
1107(g) (2000).
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language ultimately enacted is much broader than what the court contemplated and would
actually infringe on Fifth Amendment Due Process guarantees.99 Also absent from the original
version of Rule 23(d), and, therefore, not considered by the Doe court, was the third ground now
encompassed by § 1107 allowing waiver if obtaining consent “is not in the interests of national
security.”100 As mentioned, statutory guidance is lacking and regulatory requirements do not
apply with regard to a waiver based on this ground.101
Issues concerning military use of investigational drugs without service members’ consent
are especially relevant to biotechnology. Despite the apparently limited grounds for waiver set
forth in § 1107, as well as extensive procedures required to implement at least the first two
grounds, waiver based on “the interests of national security” presents a formidable “loophole.”
99

What the Doe court contemplated becomes especially relevant considering that current Supreme Court Justice

Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion, with the dissent written by current Justice Thomas!
100

See 10 U.S.C. § 1107(f)(1)(C) (2000).

101

However, Department-specific regulation appears to address this ground, stating:
If the request [for waiver of consent] is based on . . . [grounds of non-feasibility or being contrary
to members’ best interests] the documentation will include a statement that certifies and a written
justification that documents that each of the criteria and standards set forth in 21 C.F.R. 50.23(d)
(reference omitted) . . . have been met. If the Secretary finds it highly impracticable to certify that
all such criteria and standards have been fully met because doing so would significantly impair the
Department of Defense’s ability to carry out the particular military mission, the Secretary will
provide to the President a written justification that documents which criteria and standards have or
have not been met, explains the reasons for not meeting those which have not been met, and
provides additional justification why a waiver should be granted solely on . . . [grounds of national
security interests].

DOD DIRECTIVE 6200.2, supra note 81, at 4.6.2.
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Moreover, the use of “particular military operation” instead of “combat or immediate threat of
combat” expands the range of waiver situations even further. As is true with the militaryspecific research exceptions, the potential offered by biotech products to counteract current and
pressing threats of biological warfare102 substantially increases the likelihood that such
“loopholes” will be exploited.
Further, Supreme Court precedent strictly limits remedies for harm to service members
arising from testing or investigational use of products. Under the Feres doctrine, “the
Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the
injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.”103 However, in Bivens,104
the Court recognized Constitutionally-based claims for damages brought against federal officials
102

See IATAC REPORT, supra note 11, at 26 (“Effective prophylactic vaccines are currently lacking for not only

biological warfare agents, but also many naturally occurring endemic diseases. Novel solutions based on advanced
biotechnology could provide protection from these threats for both civilian homeland security and for warfighters.”);
NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 65-67 (discussing the Army’s need to monitor commercial biotechnological
developments for transfer over into biological and chemical weapons countermeasures). Further, recent federal
legislation providing unprecedented incentives to biotech companies demonstrates the need for biotechnology R&D
to combat bioterrorist threats. See Biological, Chemical, and Radiological Weapons Countermeasures Research Act
of 2002, S. 3148, 107th Cong. §§ 2(2)(A-E), 2(3)(A-L), 201-04, 211, 216 (2002) (finding that the threat posed by
biological, chemical and radiological weapons is real and citing a multiplicity of evidentiary support; making
provisions for: federal tax incentives; a terror weapon countermeasure purchase fund; patent and marketing
protections; liability protections, including indemnification from “claims or civil actions arising from human clinical
trials and research, development, and production of countermeasures;” accelerated procedures for approval of
countermeasures; . . . ; construction of research facilities; . . . . ).
103

Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).

104

Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971).
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acting in such capacity, but cautioned that either “‘special factors counseling hesitation’ or an
‘explicit congressional declaration that another remedy is exclusive would bar such an
action.’”105
Applying this precaution to the military context, the Court held in Chappell that “taken
together, the unique disciplinary structure of the Military Establishment and Congress’ activity in
the field constitute ‘special factors’ which dictate that it would be inappropriate to provide
enlisted military personnel a Bivens-type remedy against their superior officers.”106 The Court
extended this concept in Stanley, albeit in a 5-4 decision, holding “no Bivens remedy is available
for injuries that ‘arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.’”107 Under this
established precedent, the involvement of service members in military-based R&D of biotech
products, as well as the use of investigational biotech drugs and products for force health
protection,108 surely qualifies as “activity incident to service.” Accordingly, service members
have no cause of action for injuries “arising out of or in the course of such service.”
Despite the extent of these statutorily- and judicially-created military exceptions, a
January 2002 report issued at the behest of DoD calls for the creation and implementation of
regulations specific to biotechnology testing and use in the military109. The authors state,
105

United States v. Stanley, 438 U.S. 669, 678 (1987) (referring to the Court’s subsequent decisions in Davis v.

Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1979) and Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980)).
106

Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983).

107

483 U.S. at 684 (quoting Feres, 340 U.S. at 146).

108

DOD DIRECTIVE 6200.2, supra note 81.

109

IATAC REPORT, supra note 11, at 21-23.
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“[although] [c]urrent law does not prohibit the biotechnology applications listed in this study,110 .
. . there is no clear policy or guidance as to the use of these new and unique technologies, nor has
the law begun to address these issues.”111 They suggest the creation of an Institutional Review
Board (IRB) analogous to the IRB implemented in the Human Genome Project conducted by the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Department of Energy (DoE).112 Further, the authors
urge the creation of accelerated procedures for FDA approval based on military exigency,113 as
well as a specific procedure for waiver of informed consent regarding the use of biotech products
in the field, as based on 21 C.F.R. Parts 50, 312114.
Realization of biotech-specific protections has already begun to develop in the private
sector. In October, Congress enacted the Biological, Chemical, and Radiological Weapons
Countermeasures Research Act of 2002.115 The Act gives incentives for the research and
development of biotech products as countermeasures to biological warfare.116 Most notably, the
Act provides liability protection to biotech companies engaged in countermeasures research.117
110

Id. at 21 (exemplars contemplated include, but are not limited to: advanced vaccines and immune enhancements,

accelerated wound healing, stasis for warfighter casualties, 24x7 operations, enhanced environmental endurance and
cognition).
111

Id.

112

Id. at 21, 82.

113

Id. at 22, 82.

114

Id.

115

Biological, Chemical, and Radiological Weapons Countermeasures Research Act of 2002, S. 3148, 107th Cong. §

1(a) (2002).
116

Id. at §§ 201-04, 211-21.

117

Id. at § 204.
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Companies are indemnified from claims for damages brought by human subject participants.118
Further, the Act provides for accelerated FDA approval procedures for biotech products.119
Although specifically applicable to the private sector, such protections carry over to the military
sector considering the direct applicability of countermeasures to military functions.
Domestic Law and Policy of the United Kingdom
In terms of its government structure, the United Kingdom120 has a constitutional
monarchy, with the monarch serving as the official chief of state and an elected Prime Minister
fulfilling the actual head of government position.121, 122 As compared to the U.S., the U.K. varies
considerably in that its constitution remains unwritten, consisting of “legislative sources,
common law and constitutional conventions and custom.”123 However, analogous to the U.S.,
the U.K. has a bicameral legislative branch, Parliament, which contains the House of Lords and
the House of Commons.124 Also similar to the U.S. is the multi-tiered approach of the U.K.
judicial system, which separates criminal from civil matters and provides for appellate review.125
118

Id.

119

Id. at § 211.

120

The term “United Kingdom” as used in this paper refers to England. See generally Price, United

Kingdom, supra note 24, at ¶¶ 6, 8.
121

See id. at ¶¶ 3-4.

122

At present, Queen Elizabeth is the British monarch and chief of state, with Anthony C. L. (Tony) Blair serving as

Prime Minister.
123

Price, United Kingdom, supra note 24, at ¶ 3.

124

Id. at ¶ 5. However, distinct from the election of members to both houses of the U.S. legislature, in the U.K.,

only one house, the House of Commons, consists of elected officials. Id.
125

Id. at ¶ 7 (describing the structure as follows:
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As opposed to the U.S., the U.K. system of health care is administered through a National
Health Service (NHS), although, in practice, the trend is towards privatization of health care
providers.126 Separate from NHS, but still instrumental in its operation, is the Department of
Health (DoH).127 Further, an executive agency of DoH, the Medicines Control Agency (MCA),
serves as the licensing authority for all medicinal products within the U.K.128

The court system . . . is headed by the House of Lords and just below it, the Court of Appeal . . . , .
. . the latter divides into a separate Criminal and Civil Division. . . . [C]ivil matters are dealt with
at first instance by either the High Court ( . . . three divisions; the Queen’s Bench, Chancery and
Family divisions) or the County Court. Criminal matters come first to either the Magistrates Court
or the Crown Court.)
126

See id. at ¶¶ 23-28. The National Health Service (NHS), implemented through passage of the National Health

Service Act 1946, created in the U.K. a comprehensive system of health care free at the point of delivery. Id. After
several legislative changes affecting its structure, NHS administration was dramatically simplified in 1996 through
the Health Authorities Act 1995. Id. In terms of function, passage of the National Health Service and Community
Care Act 1990 gave hospitals the right to opt out of Health Authority (HA) control and become, themselves, NHS
Trusts. Id. Health Authorities then progressively converted from providers of health care to purchasers of these
services from others, primarily hospitals/NHS Trusts. Id. Today’s trend cuts out even the HA step, with NHS
Trusts holding an estimated ¾ of the NHS budget and using these funds for the direct purchase of health care
services from private providers. Id. The emergence of joint service-provision ventures is breaking down the
industry’s historical public/private-sector barrier. Id. Recent legislation in the form of the Health and Social Care
Act 2001 has begun to implement the government’s “new NHS plan,” a 10-year course of action backed by
significant funding increases and designed to modernize the system through investment and reform. See id.; Tony
Blair, Foreword to THE NHS PLAN (Apr. 1, 2002), http://www.doh.gov.uk/nhsplan/foreword.htm.
127

See, e.g., KENNEDY & GRUBB, supra note 27, at ¶ 1.03 (stating that the DoH supports the Secretary of State in

carrying out Secretarial responsibilities set forth in the NHS Act 1977); Blair, supra note 126 (“The Department of
Health is playing a key role in implementing the Government’s new NHS plan.”); Dep’t of Health, About the
Department (Apr. 1, 2002), http://www.doh.gov.uk/about/index.html (“We [DoH] have more than 5000 staff who
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The National Health Service Act 1977, as amended,129 is the primary piece of legislation
regulating the U.K. system of health care today.130 The Act effectively designates the Secretary
of State as head of NHS and provides for the delegation of Secretarial duties as appropriate.131
Two additional bodies, the DoH and NHS Executive (NHSE), further support the Secretary in
administering duties under the Act, with “strategic and managerial responsibility within NHS”

are responsible for driving forward change and modernization in the NHS and social care, as well as improving
standards of public health.”).
128

Dep’t of Health, supra note 127, at Executive Agencies, http://www.doh.gov.uk/about/agencies.htm.

129

National Health Service Act, 1977, c. 49 (Eng.).

130

Price, United Kingdom, supra note 24, at ¶ 36 (“Part I of the Act addresses secondary medical care in hospitals,

as well as community health services . . . . Part II governs primary care . . . , [covering] general medical, dental,
ophthalmic and pharmaceutical services.”); see also id. (relevant subsequent legislation includes the NHS (Primary
Care) Act 1997 and the Health and Social Care Act 2001); KENNEDY & GRUBB, supra note 27, at ¶ 1.03 (noting that
the NHS is organized in accordance with the NHS Act 1977, NHS and Community Care Act 1990, and NHS
(Primary Care) Act 1997).
131

See KENNEDY & GRUBB, supra note 27, at ¶ 1.03 (stating “[T]he Secretary of State is given wide enabling

powers to fulfill his or her statutory obligations, supported by a team of ministerial colleagues to whom specific
responsibilities may be delegated.”).
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falling on the latter.132 Statements of policy issued by both bodies serve as the main vehicle for
internal system regulation.133
Separate from the provision of health care services under NHS is the regulation of
medicinal products both domestically and throughout the European Community (EC).134
Initially, the Medicines Act 1968 provided the U.K. with “a comprehensive system of licensing
affecting manufacture, sale, supply and importation of medicinal products.”135 After formally
joining the EC in 1973, the Act was amended and additional legislation was enacted to bring
132

Specifically, DoH supports the Secretary of State in carrying out responsibilities [i.e., making policy and priority

decisions, as well as allocating resources for the achievement of chosen objectives] by advising on policy
development, proposing legislation, liaising with other government departments, etc. KENNEDY & GRUBB, supra
note 27, at ¶ 1.03. The main function of NHSE is to ensure the appropriate, effective and efficient use of allocated
resources, but, at times, may also serve to advise on policy matters. Id. at ¶ 1.04.
133

Id. at ¶ 1.68 (“Internal regulation of the health service is most commonly achieved by means of health service

circulars [aka Executive Letters], health service guidelines, and various other statements of policy from the NHSE
and the [DoH].”).
134

See generally Medicines Control Agency, About the Agency: Regulatory framework, Current legal framework

(last updated Aug. 2, 2002), http://www.mca.gov.uk/aboutagency/regframework/regframework.htm (describing
current system as follows:
The control of medicines in the UK is primarily through the system of licensing and conditional
exemptions from licensing laid down in EC [European Community] legislation, the Medicines Act
1968 and in relevant subordinate legislation. This legislation covers inter alia the systems by
which licences to manufacture, market, distribute, sell and supply medicinal products are granted
by Ministers (“the Licensing Authority”) (or, in the new centralized system, by the relevant
Community institutions), once they are satisfied about the safety, efficacy, and quality of the
product.).
135

Id. at The Medicines Act.
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U.K. domestic law into conformity with European law.136 Although the MCA continues to
administer the domestic system as established by the original Act, the preferred method of
licensing is now through the centralized system administered by the European Medicines
Evaluation Agency (EMEA).137 Most notably, biotechnology products are always licensed
through this European-wide centralized system.138
Despite the statutory framework governing both the provision of health care services, as
well as the licensing of products used for such services, domestic legislation covering product
R&D remains deficient. Although complex statutory schemes cover testing on animals and
human gametes or embryos,139 the U.K. has failed to enact any direct legislation concerning
R&D involving actual human subjects.140 Most significantly, no formal statutory requirement
exists for the approval of research proposals by a research ethics committee (REC).141 Further,
136

Id. at European legislation.

137

Price, United Kingdom, supra note 24, at ¶ 92 (stating that licensing through the European-wide centralized

system is preferred because approval is then valid in all EC Member States).
138

Id. at n.4.

139

Price, United Kingdom, supra note 24, at ¶ 697 (Supp. 28) (“[O]nly research involving human gametes or

embryos, and animals, is directly regulated by statute; by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (crossreference omitted) and the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 respectively.”).
140

See KENNEDY & GRUBB, supra note 27, at ¶ 13.65 (noting that the U.K. currently lacks an overarching statutory

framework governing the conduct of biomedical research on humans); see also FOURTH CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT,
supra note 27, at ¶¶ 13.66-13.74 (Sept. 2001) (updating main text and noting the promulgation of a new standards
framework for human research; however, still no indication of actual statutory regulations).
141

KENNEDY & GRUBB, supra note 27, at ¶ 13.69 (“[T]here is no formal law regulating research . . . [which] means,

among other things, that, as a matter of law, there is no requirement that a research proposal even be submitted to,
let alone approved by, an REC.”)
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healthy volunteer subjects participating in clinical trials fall outside the regulatory protections
embodied in the domestic licensing scheme.142 Fortunately, these deficiencies are eliminated in
the European Union (EU) Clinical Trials Directive,143 which the U.K., as a Member State, must
incorporate into its own law on or before May 1, 2004.144
However, until such legislation is enacted, primary authorities having potential
implications in human subject research consist of international145 and European human rights
instruments,146 corresponding U.K. legislation implementing such instruments, the medicine
142

Price, United Kingdom, supra note 24, at ¶ 727 (Supp. 28) (“Phase I trials, the first involving humans, are

designed to determine the safe tolerable dose of the drug and are carried out on human volunteers as opposed to
patients, as a consequence of which they are outside the regulatory scheme under the Medicines Act 1968 (crossreference omitted).”
143

Council Directive 2001/20/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 121) 34.

144

Price, United Kingdom, supra note 24, at ¶ 699 (Supp. 28) (also noting that under this Directive, “a

comprehensive legislative framework for medical research will be established in the UK in the near future”).
145

International human rights instruments specifically covering medical ethics include: The Nuremberg Code, The

Declaration of Helsinki, and The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences [CIOMS]
“International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects.” No such instrument has
legal force within a particular country until incorporated into its domestic law. See, e.g., LAMMY BETTEN, THE
HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998: WHAT IT MEANS 2 (1999) (describing this requirement in the UK:
In Britain, international agreements are concluded by the Crown under the Royal Prerogative, and,
therefore they must not change the substance of the common law or statute. Consequently, treaties
and Conventions need to be transformed into domestic law by an Act of Parliament in order to
give effect to them within our national legal system.)
146

European human rights instruments include the European Convention on Human Rights, which the U.K. has

incorporated by way of the Human Rights Act 1998, and the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine, which opened for signature in 1997 but the U.K. has yet to sign, Price, United Kingdom, supra note
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licensing scheme, and the common law. In the human rights arena, the European Convention on
Human Rights,147 as incorporated into U.K. law through the Human Rights Act 1998,148 may
provide implied protection to all research subjects. The Act prohibits any public authority,
meaning a person whose function is of a public nature,149 from acting in ways incompatible with
Convention rights.150 Considering the public nature of, at least, government entities such as
NHS institutions, agencies, and RECs, research activity conducted or sponsored by these entities

24, at ¶¶ 103, 105, 122; see also Council of Europe Treaty Office, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and dignity of the human being with regard to the application of biology and medicine: Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine, ETS no.: 164, Chart of signatures and ratifications (status as of 14/11/02),
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/WhatYouWant.asp?.
147

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221,

E.T.S. 5.
148

“An Act to give further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human

Rights.” Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42 (Eng.). “In this Act ‘the Convention rights’ means the rights and
fundamental freedoms set out in – Articles 2 to 12 and 14 of the Convention, Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol,
and Articles 1 and 2 of the Sixth Protocol, as read with Articles 16 to 18 of the Convention.” Id. at § 1(1)(a-c).
Convention rights include: Article 2 Right to Life; Article 3 Prohibition of Torture; Article 4 Prohibition of Slavery
and Forced Labour; Article 5 Right to Liberty and Security; Article 6 Right to a Fair Trial; Article 7 No Punishment
Without Law; Article 8 Right to Respect for Private and Family Life; Article 9 Freedom of Thought, Conscience
and Religion; Article 10 Freedom of Expression; Article 11 Freedom of Assembly and Association; Article 12 Right
to Marry; Article 14 Prohibition of Discrimination; Article 16 Restrictions on Political Activity of Aliens; Article 18
Limitation on Use of Restrictions on Rights. Id. at sched. 1, pt. I. First Protocol rights include: Article 1 Protection
of Property; Article 2 Right to Education; Article 3 Right to Free Elections; id. at pt. II, and Sixth Protocol rights
include: Article 1 Abolition of the Death Penalty; Article 2 Death Penalty in Time of War, id. at pt. III.
149

Id. at § 6(3)(b).

150

Id. at § 6(1).
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should fall under the Act’s proscriptions,151 but duties owed to research subjects come only by
implication.152 On the other hand, the U.K. licensing scheme covers all entities, public and
private, and provides specific protections in clinical trials, but only to “patient” subjects, as
opposed to healthy volunteers.
Where questions arise as to legislative coverage of human subject research, common law
concepts related to the torts of battery and negligence, combined with the doctrine of consent,
provide answers. Analogous to the present status of U.K. statutory law, no case law directly
addresses the protection of human research subjects. However, as is true with general principles
of medical law, legally effective consent, and, specifically, consent to be touched, is necessary to
counter a claim of battery. To qualify as “legally effective,” issues of who may give consent,
and the validity and limits of consent obtained must be satisfied. Reaching the latter two issues
is the requirement that consent be sufficiently informed, with failure to provide adequate
information potentially sounding in negligence.
Beyond these primary sources, government bodies, namely the NHSE and DoH, have
promulgated protections in the form of directives and guidelines.153 Both technically regulate
151

See Price, United Kingdom, supra note 24, at ¶106.

152

Neither the Act nor the Convention rights incorporated, see supra note 148, explicitly mention humans serving as

research subjects.
153

KENNEDY & GRUBB, supra note 27, at ¶¶ 13.66-13.69 (stating:
[T]he Department of Health, having taken advice, issued Guidelines in 1991 through the NHS
Management Executive (HSG 91(5)). Perhaps the principal factor which persuaded government
to act, albeit in a non-statutory manner, was a concern at the lack of legal protection available to
research subject. The Guidelines which emerged, . . . . . . . are the closest the United Kingdom
government has come to regulating the conduct of research on human subjects. . . . The Guidelines
lay certain duties on various bodies within the NHS . . . . Principal among these duties is the
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only NHS bodies, but, in practice, affect all research activities in the U.K.154 The most significant
protection afforded through this mechanism calls for the creation of a REC to review all research
proposals involving, in any way, the NHS.155 Detailed guidelines govern the composition and
operation of these RECs.156 Moreover, their decisions are subject to judicial review, although

creation of a local REC . . . . The Guidelines only apply, of course, to activities undertaken within
the ambit of the NHS. . . . In practice, however, this limitation may be more apparent than real.
Nonetheless, whatever the situation may be in practice, it remains odd, and some would say
unfortunate, that there is no formal law regulating research. It means, among other things, that, as
a matter of law, there is no requirement that a research proposal even be submitted to, let alone
approved by, an REC.)
154

Id. at ¶ 13.68 (describing reasons for the broad reach of the Guidelines:
The Guidelines only apply, of course, to activities undertaken within the ambit of the NHS. To
that extent, those who conduct research outside the NHS are under no duty to comply with them. .
. . In practice, however, this limitation may be more apparent than real. . . . [The Guidelines]
extend to any research involving the use of NHS patients or premises. To the extent that non-NHS
researchers, . . . , might wish to conduct research, it is difficult to do so without using NHS
patients or premises. . . . [Also] companies sponsoring research will ordinarily wish to ensure that
the Guidelines are followed, both because they represent considered public policy but also because
it is clearly in their commercial interests to be seen to behave responsibly. . . . [Finally] the
Guidelines’ most significant regulatory mechanism, the REC, is now a standard feature of
biomedical research . . . . Indeed, bodies which provide financial support for research and editors
of journals which publish research results both tend to insist on evidence that research has
received approval from an REC.).

155

Id. at ¶ 13.67 (“The Guidelines lay certain duties on various bodies within the NHS . . . . Principal among these

duties is the creation of a local REC . . . .”).
156

See DEP’T OF HEALTH, Governance Arrangements for NHS Research Ethics Committees (July 2001).
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liability falls on members in their individual capacities, as the REC itself has no legal
personality.157
Additionally, secondary sources provide further protection through guidance issued by
government-sponsored158 and independent agencies,159 as well as professional organizations
hailing from both the U.K.160 and abroad.161 Termed “quasi-law,” such guidance assumes the
force of law if adopted judicially or used as a template for domestic legislation.162 In fact,
international codes of medical research ethics espouse basic principles meant to apply to all
human subject research.163 Further, under formal international agreements, corresponding codes
157

Id. at ¶ 13.70.

158

Government-sponsored entities are generally appointed to cover a particular bioethics issue or set of related

issues, i.e. the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. Price, United Kingdom, supra note 24 at ¶ 123.
However, in contrast to almost all Western nations, the U.K. government has yet to establish a national bioethics
committee. Id.
159

For example, the Medical Research Council (MRC), which, although primarily funded through a grant-in-aid

from Parliament, is not a government department and remains independent in its advisory functions. See Medical
Research Council, Home: About MRC: Organisation of the MRC, http://www.mrc.ac.uk/index/about/aboutorganisation.htm.
160

A principal such organization is the Royal College of Physicians (RCP). See Price, United Kingdom, supra note

24, at ¶ 701 (Supp. 28).
161

For example, the World Medical Association (WMA)’s Declaration of Helsinki stands as the foremost

international code governing medical research today. See id.
162

Id. at ¶ 104.

163

Id. at ¶ 701 (Supp. 28).
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or guidelines may be incorporated by reference, thereby imposing duties upon signatory nations
under international law.164
Despite this multitude of sources governing, directly or indirectly, human subject
research in the U.K., allegations of horrific experiments conducted by the country’s own
Ministry of Defence (MoD) raise doubts as to whether protections actually extend to the Military
Establishment. As is true in the U.S., the potential offered by biotechnology in the defense
context makes its research, development, and rapid implementation into the armed forces
essential. Also of significance to both nations is a history of abuse of service members serving
as research subjects, thereby bringing to the forefront the issue of their protection in biotech
R&D. Considering the military-specific need for rapid implementation of biotech products,
service personnel using such products that are not yet licensed, or not licensed for the particular
use, appear equally entitled to protections afforded research subjects.
Compared to exposure of such abuses in the U.S., investigation into similar events in the
U.K. remains forthcoming. As recently as 1997 and to the European Court of Human Rights, no
less, the MoD denied ever having used human subjects for radiation experiments.165 Today, their
164

Id. at ¶ 103 (noting that principles of medical law are “increasingly becoming the subject of international

provisions and obligations embedded in Conventions, Protocols, [etc.]”).
165

Case of L.C.B. v. The United Kingdom, 4 B.H.R.C. 447 (1998) (circumstances of the case:
10. Between 1952 and 1967 the United Kingdom carried out a number of atmospheric tests of
nuclear weapons in the Pacific Ocean and at Maralinga, Australia, involving over 20,000
servicemen. Among these tests were the “Grapple Y” and “Grapple Z” series of six detonations at
Christmas Island in the Pacific Ocean (November 1957–September 1958) of weapons many times
more powerful than those discharged at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
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official website tells a seemingly different story, stating that since 1916, at least 20,000 service
members have participated as volunteer research subjects at the Porton Down defence
laboratory.166 Many such volunteers have since, in violation of the Official Secrets Act,167
alleged injury connected with their participation, as well as insufficient information and even
outright deception used to obtain their consent168. However, the MoD maintains, not surprisingly

11. During the Christmas Island tests, service personnel were ordered to line up in the open and
to face away from the explosions with their eyes closed and covered until twenty seconds after the
blast.
The applicant alleged that the purpose of this procedure was deliberately to expose servicemen to
radiation for experimental purposes. The Government denied this and stated that it was believed at
the time of the tests, and was the case, that personnel were sufficiently far from the centre of the
detonations

to

avoid

being

exposed

to

radiation

at

any

harmful

level

and that the purpose of the line-up procedure was to ensure that they avoided eye damage and
other physical injury caused by material blown about by the blast.);
Case of McGingley and Egan v. The United Kingdom, 4 B.H.R.C. 421 (1998) (circumstances as stated in
paragraph 11 of L.C.B. case).
166

Ministry of Defense, Porton Down Volunteers: The Volunteer Programme (page modified Feb. 2002)

[hereinafter MoD Website], http://www.mod.uk/issues/portondownvolunteers/programme.htm.
167

The Act states “A person who is or has been a Crown servant . . . is guilty of an offence if without lawful

authority he makes a damaging disclosure of information, document or other article relating to defence which is or
has been in his possession by virtue of his position as such.” Official Secrets Act, 1989, c. 6, § 2(1) (Eng.). “Crown
servant” encompasses “any member of the naval, military or air forces of the Crown.” Id. at § 12(1)(d). “Defence”
includes “the weapons, stores or other equipment of those forces and the invention, development, production and
operation of such equipment and research relating to it.” Id. at § 2(4)(b) (emphasis added).
168

MoD Website, supra note 166, at Volunteer Complaints (stating:
Some volunteers say that their health has suffered as a result of the trials in which they
participated. . . .
Unpublished Work © 2003 Ashley R. Melson, J.D., R.P.T.

42

in light of the current criminal investigation169 and potential for significant civil litigation,170 that
no evidence exists to-date in support of volunteers’ allegations171. Along similar lines, the MoD
recently confirmed that military personnel were involved in nuclear weapons tests conducted in
Australia in the 1950’s, but stated the testing was of clothing not humans.172
Until last year, the protections afforded research subjects were, in effect, not applicable
to armed forces personnel serving as such during the period of the alleged violations. Through
Section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, the Crown, including MoD, received blanket

The second main complaint is that they were duped into attending the trials; particularly relevant
being the story that people responded to a notice requesting volunteers for common cold research.
...
A third complaint is that the nature of the trials was not explained to volunteers on arrival, or that
the risks involved were substantially misrepresented to them.).
169

Wiltshire Constabulary, Operation Antler, History (2002), http:www.wiltshire.police.uk/antler/index.htm

(stating:
In July 1999 the Force commenced enquiries into allegations made by a former serviceman, who
stated that during his National Service he took part in research . . . [and] that those carrying out the
experiments on him have assaulted him. He further alleged that another serviceman had been
killed in an illegal experiment involving Nerve Gas at Porton in 1953. As a result of this and other
allegations the Force initiated a major enquiry. Named Operation Antler, its purpose is to examine
the issues surrounding the Service Volunteer Programme at Porton Down in relation to
experiments conducted into the use of chemical and biological agents during the period 19391989.).
170

See infra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.

171

MoD Website, supra note 166, at Volunteer Complaints.

172

Jim Green, UK Admits Military Personnel Deliberately Exposed to Nuclear Tests, ENVTL. NEWS SERVICE, May

18, 2001, http://ens-news.com/ens/may2001/2001-05-18-04.asp.
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immunity from liability to service members for injury or death attributable to their military
service prior to 1987.173 In January 2002, the High Court found Section 10 to be incompatible
with the Human Rights Act guarantee of a fair trial, thereby opening the door for all veterans to
bring compensation claims against the Crown in civil proceedings.174 Although the Court of
173

As originally promulgated in 1947, the Act stated:
No proceedings in tort shall lie against the Crown for death or personal injury due to anything
suffered by a member of the armed forces of the Crown if(a) that thing is suffered by him in consequence of the nature or condition of any such land,
premises, ship, aircraft or vehicle as aforesaid, or in consequence of the nature or condition of any
equipment or supplies used for the purposes of those forces; and (b) the Minister of Pensions
certifies as mentioned in the preceding section; . . . .
Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, c.44, § 10(2) (Eng.).

Subsequent legislation repealed this section, but only as to liability for death or injury occurring from 1987 onward.
Crown Proceedings Act, 1987, c.25, § 1 (Eng.) (“[S]ection 10 . . . shall cease to have effect except in relation to
anything suffered by a person in consequence of an act or omission committed before the date on which this Act is
passed.”) (emphasis added).
174

Alan Robert Matthews v. The Ministry of Defence, 2002 C.P. Rep. 26 (Q.B. 2002); see also

Russell, Jones & Walker, Landmark Decision Gives Hope to Thousands of War Veterans (Jan. 23, 2002),
http://www.rjw.co.uk/newsandevents/news2002/jan23.aspx (quoting Alan Care, attorney for over 450 Porton Down
veterans:
We’ve been campaigning for years to overturn this draconian law which gives the Ministry of
Defence blanket immunity. Before yesterday’s ruling the Ministry of Defence would issue a
Section 10 certificate stating that injury or death was attributable to service, giving rise to the right
to claim a war pension. However, the Porton Down volunteers received nothing . . . .
The Ministry of Defence is appealing the decision but this judgment at long last recognises that
Section 10 immunity must not stand.).
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Appeals has subsequently overturned the Ruling,175 further appeal is pending in the House of
Lords.176 The extent of claims to follow will turn on the outcome of this final appeal in light of
findings from Wiltshire’s present criminal investigation surrounding events at Porton Down from
1939-1989177.
As demonstrated by the High Court ruling, protection of research subjects is intended, at
least today, to apply to the Military Establishment. First, principles from international codes of
research ethics theoretically cover all research activity.178 Further, neither European-wide nor
domestic sources of authority provide any military-specific exemption concerning human
research protections. In fact, incorporation of the EU Clinical Trials Directive into domestic law
will address a “loophole” in the current licensing scheme,179 which fails to protect the largest
category of military research participants, namely, healthy volunteers. Finally, even if the MoD
were exempt from providing such protections, collaborative defense research partners, whether
175

Matthews v. Ministry of Defence, 2002 WL 820098 (C.A. Civ. Div. 2002).

176

Coffin, Mew & Clover, Personal Injury, Current Topics, Ex-servicemen lose chance to claim damages,

http://www.coffinmew.co.uk/fla_current_injury.htm.
177

Wiltshire Constabultary, supra note 169, at History.

178

Price, United Kingdom, supra note 24, at ¶ 701 (Supp. 28).

179

Medicines Control Agency (MCA), EU Directive on Good Clinical Practice in Clinical Trials, DH & MCA

Briefing Note, Version 2 ¶ 18 (Feb. 8, 2002),
http://www.mca.gov.uk/ourwork/licensingmeds/types/clinicaltrialbriefnote.pdf (“Currently, studies in healthy
volunteers . . . do not require regulatory approval and can commence after an ethics committee has given a
favourable opinion. The Directive will require the submission to the MCA of an application for authorization and
favourable ethics committee opinion before a healthy volunteer trial can commence.”).
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from another government sector, industry, or academia, remain bound to existing legal
requirements180.
Because MoD no longer has blanket immunity from civil proceedings brought by service
members,181 the common law has assumed a special relevance to the Establishment’s treatment
of its members in connection with military service. In the area of military testing and use of
experimental products, common law principles of consent set the standard to counter tort claims
sounding in battery or negligence182. Considering that the majority of defense-related research is
“non-therapeutic,” or not intended to benefit the research subject,183 and, as such, is typically
carried out on healthy volunteers,184 the standard of legally effective consent is high. Of primary
concern in the military context is the following:
Voluntariness is of particular importance in the case of non-therapeutic
research. The law is vigilant to ensure that participation results from genuine
agreement rather than from duress or coercion. A particular area of difficulty
relates to those who by virtue of their status or relationship with the researcher
may find it difficult to refuse consent, though they might wish to do so. Groups
that are vulnerable to exploitation include armed forces personnel asked by their
superiors in rank.185
180

See supra note 154 (describing the broad reach of NHS Guidelines).

181

See supra note 173-76 (no blanket immunity from liability for death or injury occurring after date of repeal and,

pending House of Lords decision, potentially even for death or injury before date of repeal).
182

KENNEDY & GRUBB, supra note 27, at ¶¶ 13.03, 13.06; Price, United Kingdom, supra note 24, at ¶¶ 707, 715

(Supp. 28).
183

KENNEDY & GRUBB, supra note 27, at ¶¶ 13.05, 13.35.

184

Id.

185

Id.
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Further, researchers must provide sufficient information for the subject’s decision to qualify as
being “informed.”186
Even if the consent given is voluntary and informed, limits exist, at least by way of
ethical constraints, as to what activities may be consented to. In short, healthy volunteers should
never be exposed to more than “minimal risk,”187 which one authority defines as “a small chance
of a recognized reaction which is itself trivial, e.g., headache, or a very remote chance of a
serious disability or death, e.g., that encountered by flying as a passenger in a scheduled
aircraft.”188 Today’s military R&D, especially that implicating human subjects, focuses on using
biotechnology to develop countermeasures for biological and chemical weapons.189 Such
research, as well as the provision of yet investigational biotech products for use by personnel
particularly susceptible to exposure, surely implicates more than “minimal” risk. A significantly
higher standard of risk is permissible in therapeutic research,190 but the issue then would be
finding people already exposed to these warfare agents.
In light of these common law constraints, as well as the loss of MoD immunity, the ongoing Porton Down investigation, and an overall increased awareness of human rights issues, the
186

Id.; Price, United Kingdom, supra note 24, at ¶ 715 (“Consent must be explicit and all relevant information must

be provided. These remarks suggest that an absence of such knowledge would even go to battery rather than
negligence.” (footnotes omitted)).
187

Id.

188

Id. (citing definition from Royal College of Medicine, Research on Healthy Volunteers, in MANUAL FOR

RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEES (4th ed. 1996)).
189

See IATAC REPORT, supra note 11, at 25-28, 89-93; NRC REPORT, supra note 12, at 65-67.

190

Therapeutic research is that which is conducted on patients, as opposed to healthy volunteers, and is intended to

provide benefits to research subjects, as opposed to merely generating scientific data. KENNEDY & GRUBB, supra
no
te 27, at ¶ 13.05; Price, United Kingdom, supra note 24, at ¶¶ 702, 706.
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MoD should comply with ethical research principles whether or not legally bound to do so by
any instrument or doctrine. Moreover, realizing that products may be implemented into the
military regimen before full testing and licensure, service members using such products should
receive the same protections as do research subjects.
Conclusion
Because collaborative research efforts, both between the U.S. and the U.K.,191 as well as
with other allies,192 industry,193 and academia,194 is imperative to reach military biotech goals,
the protections afforded to research subjects must ultimately be commensurate in all arenas.
Furthermore, most military operations are now conducted jointly, implicating the need for
interoperability of forces.195 Joint missions combining Allied forces inherently calls for a unified
defense policy regarding the use of experimental products during these operations.
191

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.

192

See supra note 30 and accompanying text.

193

See, e.g., NRC REPORT, supra note 188, at 3 (concluding:
To keep pace with the unprecedented rate of discovery and the anticipated increase in
biotechnology developments, the Army will have to establish new, effective partnerships with the
emerging biotechnology industry, participate in research, leverage research and developments in
the commercial sector, and develop its internal capabilities (organization and personnel) to act on
opportunities as they arise.).

194

See, e.g., Colleen Kinder, Yale professors find deep pockets in Defense Dept., YALE HERALD, Oct. 19, 2001, at 5,

http://www.yaleheld.com/archive/xxxii/10.19.01/news/p5.html.
195

See supra note 38 and accompanying text; see also Ministry of Defence, Key Facts, Defence and Technology

(page modified Feb. 6, 2002), http://www.mod.uk.aboutus/factfiles/technology.htm (“We need also to ensure that
there is no technology gap between ourselves and our Allies and coalition partners, so that we can continue to work
closely together around the world, as we do in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Iraq.”).
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In sum, peacetime must be utilized to formulate, solidify, and implement protections to
service members concerning biotech testing and use in the military. History has shown that
addressing such issues in wartime inevitably leads to practices based on a “sacrifice of the few
for the good of the many” mentality. In light of the sacrifices already made, as well as the risks
inherently accepted by members by virtue of their military service, the nation they defend owes
each member a reciprocal duty to respect individual human rights. As has been aptly stated,
“Indeed the safest road to Hell is the gradual one - the gentle slope, soft underfoot, without
sudden turnings, without milestones, without signposts.”196
196

CLIVE STAPLES LEWIS, THE SCREWTAPE LETTERS 61 (1942).
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